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Introduction 
 In 1965, three public school students protested the Vietnam War by wearing black 
armbands in defiance of school policy. Their resulting odyssey through the American 
judicial system produced the landmark decision in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
Community School District (1969), in which the United States Supreme Court issued a 
sweeping defense of student speech rights. Nearly 50 years later, Tinker remains the 
litmus test for determining whether school disciplinary actions directed at core political 
speech violate the First Amendment.   
Over the years, cases have emerged to narrow the scope of the Tinker standard. 
But Tinker’s central holding—that students retain their constitutionally protected rights to 
free speech in the public school setting—continues to provide the broadest expression of 
the scope of student speech rights and thus remains vital as one of the Supreme Court’s 
watershed First Amendment decisions. Yet despite Tinker’s continuing validity, issues 
concerning its scope and application continue to bedevil American courts—especially as 
they grapple with student speech in the university setting.  
We will explore freedom of expression on college campuses by undertaking a 
brief review of legal precedents, starting with the establishment of the Tinker standard 
and continuing through three subsequent, closely related cases. Then, I will provide a 
framework for examination of both higher education cases and public employment cases. 
This will include review of a recent, high profile case directly involving our central issues 
of freedom of speech, application of student conduct codes, and use of social media, 
Tatro v. University of Minnesota (2012), as well as a controversial public employment 
case that made universities take notice, Garcetti v. Cabellos (2006). 
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This thesis studies several aspects of the Tinker standard as it relates to higher 
education by providing historical background and offering answers to a series of central 
questions: 
 1.  Is Tinker the appropriate standard to use in higher education?   
Given the differences in educational and disciplinary goals between PK-12 
education and higher education, is it appropriate to use the same standard in both 
settings? What have courts said about the application of Tinker in higher education? Do 
public employee speech rights have any bearing on freedom of expression in higher 
education? If not Tinker, what is the appropriate standard? 
 2.  How do social media intersect with the law and conduct codes?   
Many schools have struggled with behavior that takes place off school grounds 
and debate whether they have “jurisdiction” to impose discipline for off-school 
misbehavior. In the age of social media this concept has been turned on its head, and we 
bear witness to an unprecedented time of confusion regarding school authority over 
behaviors employing or simply involving social media. We will explore the definition of 
“off campus” in the age of social media, investigate the history of incidents on campuses 
involving free speech rights and social media, and examine the first litigated case to 
present all of these elements, Tatro v. University of Minnesota (2012).   
 3.  Should higher education institutions monitor students’ social media? 
While virtually every institution already has a student conduct code, most have 
not yet used that code to discipline students for actions that take place on social media. 
Active monitoring of students’ social media activities has occurred only in the PK-12 
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setting and in athletics programs. We are just starting to see challenges to these situations 
arise, so colleges and universities must deal with the question of monitoring social media.   
 4.  Should higher education institutions discipline speech at all? Are there  
limits? 
 
This is, perhaps, the biggest question of all. I find it paradoxical when institutions 
of higher education, which are, after all, places of teaching and learning, discipline 
anyone—either student or employee—for exercising the right to free speech. The 
apparent instinct of some universities toward censorship as a frontline response to 
unpopular speech undermines educational and democratic values. Institutions should 
instead adopt a “best practices” approach when it comes to handling the question of 
disciplining or limiting speech in the age of social media. The conclusion of this 
document includes such a model.    
 In the following pages, I will discuss cases such as Tinker, Garcetti, and Tatro— 
along with instances of disciplinary action on campuses across the country—to explore 
these questions. The goal of this thesis is to answer these increasingly important 
questions, provide institutions with the background to make sound and balanced 
decisions regarding students’ free speech rights, and offer “best practices” guidelines for 
student conduct codes. 
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Tinker and its Progeny 
To determine the propriety of applying the Tinker standard in higher education, 
we must first examine Tinker itself, as well as subsequent PK-12 cases. We will also 
explore similarities and differences between application in (1) PK-12 education and 
higher education, and (2) higher education and public employment legal precedents. This 
will allow us to address the question above and determine whether or not Tinker prevails 
as the appropriate standard to use in higher education. 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District 
In December of 1965, three students in the Des Moines public school system 
attended a meeting in the home of one of the students. At this meeting, a group of adults 
and students decided to wear armbands to protest United States government policy 
regarding military action in Vietnam. Principals in the Des Moines public school system 
became aware of this plan and implemented a policy stating that students wearing 
armbands to school would first be asked to remove them and, if they did not, would be 
suspended. The three students involved knew about this policy.   
On December 16, 1965, Mary Beth Tinker and Christopher Eckhardt, both high 
school students, wore the armbands to their respective schools. John Tinker (Mary Beth’s 
younger brother) wore an armband to his junior high school the next day. All three 
students were sent home and suspended until they agreed to return without their 
armbands. The three students filed a complaint (through their parents) in United States 
District Court, which upheld the decision of the Des Moines school board (Tinker, 1966). 
The students appealed to the circuit court of appeals, but the appellate court justices were 
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tied in their votes, meaning the district court’s decision would stand (Tinker, 1966/1967). 
The students sought and obtained review by the United States Supreme Court, which 
heard the case on November 12, 1968, nearly three years after the original incident.  
In a sweeping defense of First Amendment rights, the Supreme Court ruled in 
favor of the students and found that schools could limit student political speech only 
when it would either (1) “materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of 
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school” (Tinker, 1969, p. 505) or (2) invade 
the rights of other students. The Court determined that wearing an armband did not meet 
this standard and therefore remained constitutionally protected.   
In its decision, the Supreme Court wrote: “It can hardly be argued that either 
students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech and expression 
at the schoolhouse gate” (Tinker, 1969, p. 506). Tinker makes clear that school officials 
cannot limit student political expression simply because they do not agree with or like it. 
Instead, they must prove that the expression would result in a substantial disruption of 
school activities (Tinker, 1969). 
Bethel School District v. Fraser 
In 1986, the United States Supreme Court decided Bethel School District v. 
Fraser, in which Matthew Fraser was suspended for making what the school deemed a 
vulgar assembly speech that violated school policy prohibiting “obscene, profane 
language or gestures.” Fraser sued in United States District Court and won. The school 
district appealed, and Fraser won again (Fraser, 1985). The school district then appealed 
to the United States Supreme Court.   
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In its opinion, the Court posited a balancing test of sorts, noting that “the freedom 
to advocate unpopular and controversial views in schools and classrooms must be 
balanced against society’s countervailing interest in teaching students the boundaries of 
socially appropriate behavior” (Bethel, 1986, p. 681). The Court discussed the purpose of 
public education as preparing students for citizenship, and teaching the “habits and 
manners of civility” as essential values to our society. While it did discuss our guarantee 
of “wide freedom” as related to the First Amendment, it added, “surely, it is a highly 
appropriate function of public school education to prohibit the use of vulgar and 
offensive terms in public discourse” (Bethel, 1986, p.683). 
Ultimately, the Court ruled in favor of the school district, carving out an 
exception to the Tinker standard where “vulgar and lewd speech . . . would undermine the 
school’s basic mission.” The Court also determined that “the constitutional rights of 
students in public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in 
other settings” (Bethel School District v. Fraser, 1986, p. 682). 
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier 
In the 1988 case, Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, the United States 
Supreme Court further limited the scope of Tinker by stating that “educators do not 
offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of 
student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are 
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns” (Hazelwood, 1988, p. 273). The 
case involved the censorship of a high school student newspaper through the school 
principal’s decision to remove two stories from the student publication. In the first story, 
the principal had concerns that the article might inadvertently identify students in the 
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school who had been pregnant, and that some of its content was inappropriate given the 
age of the school’s younger students. In the second piece, he had concerns about 
protecting the identities of families referenced in the article, and felt that those families 
should have been allowed to review the content of the piece before publication. 
 The student editor and two student reporters filed suit and lost in federal district 
court. The court of appeals reversed, and the school district sought review by the United 
States Supreme Court. The case was argued in 1987 and decided in 1988.   
In finding for the school district, the Court gave broad latitude to censor speech, 
“so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns” 
(Hazelwood, 1988, p. 273). The Court went on to permit an equally broad application of 
the decision, including “school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other 
expressive activities that students, parents and members of the public might reasonably 
perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school . . . whether or not they occur in a 
traditional classroom setting, so long as they are supervised by faculty members and 
designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to student participants and audiences” 
(Hazelwood, 1988, p. 271). Notably, the Court also deferred any decision as to the 
applicability of Hazelwood to universities, stating that it “need not now decide whether 
the same degree of deference is appropriate with respect to school-sponsored expressive 
activities at the college and university level” (Hazelwood, 1988, p. 273).   
Morse v. Frederick 
 Finally, we must examine Morse v. Frederick or—as it is more popularly 
known— the “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” case. In Morse, the Supreme Court further 
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narrowed the Tinker standard, concluding that schools could limit or censor speech 
promoting illegal drug use.   
 Students attending Juneau-Douglas High School were dismissed from classes on 
January 23, 2002 to watch as the Olympic torch passed through Juneau, Alaska. Joseph 
Frederick, a student at the school, gathered with some friends across the street from the 
school. This group had a banner reading “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” and they planned to 
unfurl it when television cameras filmed the torch. Upon seeing the banner, the school 
principal, Deborah Morse, confiscated it and subsequently suspended Frederick for 
violating school drug policies. Frederick appealed the suspension, first to the 
superintendent, then to the school board, and finally, upon receiving no relief from these 
parties, he filed a lawsuit in federal district court.   
 In its decision, the district court applied the limitations outlined in Bethel, finding 
that “the constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically 
coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings” (Frederick, 2003, p. 16).	  The case 
was overturned on appeal, with the Ninth Circuit concluding that neither Bethel nor 
Hazelwood was an appropriate test for this case, so Tinker remained the prevailing 
standard (Frederick, 2003/2006). The school board appealed to the Supreme Court, 
which heard the case in 2007. The Supreme Court determined that Principal Morse and 
the school district acted appropriately because it viewed the gathering as a school-
sponsored event and because it determined that the banner was promoting illegal drug 
use, which violated school and district drug policies. Two justices wrote widely discussed 
concurrences in Morse. Justice Clarence Thomas authored perhaps the most unsettling 
concurrence in this case, arguing that Tinker was simply wrong and that students enrolled 
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in public schools should be afforded no expectation of free speech. In contrast, Justice 
Samuel Alito emphasized the limited scope of the Court’s decision, stressing that Morse 
should not be seen as a retreat from Tinker (Morse, 2007). 
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Is Tinker the appropriate standard to use in higher education?   
 Tinker, Bethel, Hazelwood, and Morse were defining cases with respect to 
freedom of expression in the public PK-12 schools. But those of us in higher education 
must ask ourselves if these same standards are appropriate to colleges and universities. 
We stand charged with ensuring that student and faculty conduct codes accomplish their 
myriad goals, including protecting the reputation of the institution, while simultaneously 
guaranteeing the right to freedom of expression afforded to legal adults by the law. This 
determination necessitates examining the disparities between the two populations. 
Differences between PK-12 education and higher education 
Three fundamental differences distinguish the PK-12 public school system from 
higher education:   
• the ages of the students involved, 
 
• the fact that PK-12 education is mandatory, whereas higher education is optional, 
and 
 
• that the two have differing disciplinary and educational goals and needs. 
 
First and foremost is the age difference between the two populations. With PK-12 
students, we have minors mainly in the care of adult parents/caregivers with the school 
acting “in loco parentis” (in the place of a parent). Policy formation at the PK-12 level is 
based on the concept that students remain in the “parental” care of the school for the 
duration of the school day, and so the school must have rules to keep children safe. Over 
the course of history, the scope of this doctrine has shifted, but the basic premise remains 
the same. In contrast, virtually all students at the college and university level are legal  
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adults, solely responsible for their actions. Policies at this level are not necessarily drafted 
out of concern for student safety, but rather from a standpoint of legal protection for the 
institution itself. The age of the student also dictates the services provided in that PK-12 
school districts must be proactive in identifying potential academic, emotional, 
behavioral, and physical problems and challenges for their students, and then in 
advocating on behalf of those students.  Colleges and universities have no such 
obligation. Their students are expected to identify their own needs in those areas, provide 
documentation of any need for any assistance, and be strong advocates for themselves.    
Second, enormous differences exist between mandatory and optional education. 
With PK-12 compulsory schooling, students must attend school according to the laws of 
their state of residence. All states in the United States require attendance starting no later 
than age 8 and ending no earlier than age 16. In most states, students must start by age 6, 
and many require attendance through age 18 (Mikulecky, 2013). Public school remains 
compulsory and free, and often comes with added benefits for lower-income students 
such as free or subsidized breakfast and/or lunch programs. Higher education is entirely 
optional and generally engenders substantial costs for tuition, fees, and room and board. 
Thus, while students in PK-12 have no choice but to attend, those attending college enjoy 
a privilege they have chosen, not one to which they are automatically entitled.   
Finally, PK-12 schooling and higher education have differing disciplinary and 
educational goals and needs. While discussion persists these days as to the goals of PK-
12 education, at its core the system endures to educate students so they are properly 
prepared for work or higher education upon graduation, and to make them good citizens 
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of our country. As the United States is a republic, we adhere to the concept that we 
should not have a class system, so all of our citizens should be literate and educated to a 
certain minimum level of expectation. This is about the most basic premise on which we 
can virtually all agree before we become embroiled in a larger discussion of the 
overarching goals of public education. For PK-12 schools, this “basic” preparation has 
resulted in educating students across four broad categories:  1) physical growth, 2) 
intellectual advancement, 3) emotional maturity, and 4) social development. Teachers are 
held responsible not only for academic enlightenment, but also for developing character, 
creativity, a global worldview, personal responsibility, resiliency, entrepreneurial spirit, 
individualism, self-worth, and so on. In truth, the list of things we as a society hold PK-
12 teachers responsible for seems nearly endless. Once our children leave their capable 
hands, they are ready to enter the workforce or our colleges and universities, where their 
academic development continues.   
Historically, higher education sought to serve the elite class who could afford it, 
but more recently that concept has evolved. We now have a higher percentage of high 
school graduates attending colleges and universities, but it is in higher education where 
we seem to have the most confusion regarding development occurring outside the 
classroom walls (NCES, 2012). While virtually all colleges and universities go to great 
lengths to ensure that students and their parents understand that students enrolled in their 
institutions are now considered adults and must be responsible for their own actions, 
these same institutions have constructed complex student life/support networks. Colleges 
and universities spend enormous sums of money on housing and residence life programs, 
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advising programs, orientation programs, and student activities programs (Desrochers & 
Kirshstein, 2014).   
Institutions are fond of phrases such as “teachable moment” when describing the 
“life lessons” they provide outside of the classroom setting; however, they remain just as 
fond of distancing themselves when students do something that might result in upsetting 
a donor, or potentially result in a lawsuit. Robert Shibley, Senior Vice President of the 
Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (FIRE), a non-profit organization 
dedicated to individual rights on campus, was quoted in a July 2014 article as saying that 
colleges and universities are “afraid of lawsuits and PR problems” and that they are 
“more worried about that than about ignoring their 1st Amendment responsibilities” 
(Watanabe, 2014). As we have already determined, the Supreme Court has been careful 
in its opinions at the PK-12 level to note that those same decisions may not apply in the 
higher education setting (Hazelwood, 1988). 
Higher Education Freedom of Expression Court Cases 
Starting with Healy v. James, the Supreme Court established a pattern of 
differentiating the regulation of speech at the PK-12 level from that in higher education. 
Through rulings in five cases, it made clear that it would not impose the same limitations 
on the two differing populations. 
Healy v. James 
In the 1972 case, Healy v. James, students at Central Connecticut State College 
were denied the right to form a recognized student chapter of “Students for a Democratic 
Society.” As a recognized student organization, the chapter could have used college 
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facilities for meetings and would also have had access to the college newspaper. The 
president of the college denied the group because he feared potential “disruption and 
violence” on campus (Healy, 1972, p. 176). The students sued, and the case made its way 
through the legal system to the United States Supreme Court.   
In its decision, the Court noted that the time period in which this case arose, 1969-
1970, was one of “unrest” on college campuses, and observed that “there had been 
widespread civil disobedience” as well (Healy, 1972, p. 171). But the Court also pointed 
out that while “the causes of campus disruption were many and complex, one of the 
prime consequences of such activities was the denial of the lawful exercise of First 
Amendment rights to the majority of students by the few” (Healy, 1972, p. 171).  The 
Court also stated, “many of the most cherished characteristics long associated with 
institutions of higher learning appeared to be endangered” (Healy, 1972, p. 171).    
 The Court ultimately ruled in favor of the students, noting that “state colleges and 
universities are not enclaves immune from the sweep of the First Amendment,” and went 
on to say, “the precedents of this Court leave no room for the view that . . . First 
Amendment protections should apply with less force on college campuses than in the 
community at large” (Healy, 1972, p. 180). 
 Papish v. Board of Curators of the University of Missouri 
On the heels of its decision in Healy, another case emerged in 1973, in which the 
United States Supreme Court once again defended broad First Amendment protection on 
the college campus. The University of Missouri School of Journalism expelled a graduate 
student, Papish, for distributing a student newspaper containing “forms of indecent 
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speech” (Papish, 1973, p. 667) Papish sued in federal district court and lost, and then lost 
again in the Eighth Circuit (Papish, 1972).  
 The United States Supreme Court issued its decision—in favor of Papish—on 
March 19, 1973. In this decision, the Court expanded its earlier ruling in Healy by 
declaring that “the First Amendment leaves no room for the operation of a dual standard 
in the academic community with respect to the content of speech.” The University of 
Missouri was ordered to reinstate Papish, barring any valid academic reason for her 
dismissal (Papish, 1973, p. 671). 
Widmar v. Vincent 
 In the 1981 case, Widmar v. Vincent, the United States Supreme Court heard a 
case concerning use of campus facilities for the purpose of meetings of a registered 
religious student group. Ultimately, the Court found in favor of the students and—while 
noting that campuses do differ from more general public fora “such as streets or parks” 
(Widmar, 1981, p. 268) —upheld the notion “that students enjoy First Amendment rights 
of speech and association on the campus” (Widmar, 1981, p. 269) In an insightful 
footnote, the Court wrote: “University students are, of course, young adults. They are less 
impressionable than younger students . . .” (Widmar, 1981, p. 274). 
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia 
 The 1995 case Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia 
once again focused on the aspect of religious speech on campus, when a registered 
Christian student group at the University of Virginia was denied funding for printing 
costs because its magazine expressed particular religious beliefs. The case ultimately 
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came before the United States Supreme Court, which found in favor of the student group. 
The particulars of the case are not nearly as important to our discussion as the opinion of 
the Court, which wrote: “It is axiomatic that the government may not regulate speech 
based on its substantive content or the message it conveys. Discrimination against speech 
because of its message is presumed to be unconstitutional” (Rosenberger, 1995, p. 828). 
The Court went on to state:  
“Vital First Amendment speech principles are at stake here. The first danger to 
liberty lies in granting the State the power to examine publications to determine 
whether or not they are based on some ultimate idea and if so for the State to 
classify them. The second, and corollary, danger is to speech from the chilling of 
individual thought and expression. That danger is especially real in the University 
setting, where the State acts against a background and tradition of thought and 
experiment that operates at the center of our intellectual and philosophic 
tradition. In ancient Athens, and, as Europe entered into a new period of 
intellectual awakening, in places like Bologna, Oxford, and Paris, universities 
began as voluntary and spontaneous assemblages or concourses for students to 
speak and to write and to learn. The quality and creative power of student 
intellectual life to this day remains a vital measure of a school’s influence and 
attainment. For the University, by regulation, to cast disapproval on particular 
viewpoints of its students risks the suppression of free speech and creative inquiry 
in one of the vital centers for the Nation’s intellectual life, its college and 
university campuses.” (Rosenberger, 1995, p. 835) 
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Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth 
 Again, in the 2000 case Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v. 
Southworth, the details of the case are not as important as the opinion of the United States 
Supreme Court. The case involved students who had ideological objections to student 
groups that were the recipients of funds generated by mandatory student fees. While the 
lower courts sided with the three students who filed suit against the University of 
Wisconsin, the Supreme Court unanimously overturned the decision of the Seventh 
Circuit. In its decision, the Court wrote: “The speech the University seeks to encourage in 
the program before us is distinguished not by discernable limits but by its vast, 
unexplored bounds. To insist upon asking what speech is germane would be contrary to 
the very goal the University seeks to pursue. It is not for the Court to say what is or is not 
germane to the ideas to be pursued in an institution of higher learning” (Board of 
Regents, 2000, p. 232). Additionally, the Court noted in this case that it made “no 
distinction between campus activities and the off-campus expressive activities” of 
groups, specifically pointing out that “[u]niversities, like all of society, are finding that 
traditional conceptions of territorial boundaries are difficult to insist upon in an age 
marked by revolutionary changes in communications, information transfer, and the means 
of discourse” (Board of Regents, 2000, p. 234) The Court also observed that its “cases 
dealing with the right of teaching institutions to limit expressive freedom of students have 
been confined to high schools . . . whose students and their schools’ relation to them are 
different and at least arguably distinguishable from their counterparts in college 
education” (Board of Regents, 2000, p. 239). 
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True Threat Doctrine 
Tinker provides a foundation for thinking about the standard that should be used 
to judge free speech rights in higher education; however, in that context, another 
principle comes into play, the “true threat” doctrine established by the United States 
Supreme Court in Watts v. United States and then modified—or perhaps muddied—in its 
finding in Virginia v. Black. True threats are not protected by the Constitution, and we are 
just beginning to see more cases engaging this notion in educational settings. As we 
examine the proper speech standard for the higher education setting, it is imperative that 
we understand the difference between Tinker and its limitations as well as the precedent 
for those of us outside the PK-12 environment. After discussing these cases, I will present 
a brief history of public employee speech cases, as they are more applicable to public 
college and university faculty and students. These cases involve adults rather than 
minors, and they relate to voluntary employment as opposed to mandatory education.  
Watts v. United States 
In 1969, Robert Watts was charged with making comments threatening the life of 
President Lyndon Johnson. The eighteen-year-old was found guilty in federal court of 
“knowingly and willfully” (Watts, 1969, p. 705) threatening the life of the President, and 
a federal appellate court affirmed the conviction.  The United States Supreme Court 
reversed it, stating that Watts’s comments were a hyperbolic overstatement of frustration 
that did not constitute a “true threat” (Watts, 1969, p. 708).   
Virginia v. Black 
In Virginia v. Black, it is not the details of the case that concern us but rather, it is 
the opinion of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor: “[T]rue threats  . . . encompass those 
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statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to 
commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals. The 
speaker need not actually intend to carry out the threat. Rather, a prohibition on true 
threats protects individuals from the fear of violence and the disruption that fear 
engenders, as well as from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur” 
(Virginia, 2003, pp. 359-360).  
Rather than bring precision to the issue, Justice O’Connor’s opinion seems to give 
the lower courts considerable latitude in deciding whether a threat constitutes a “serious 
expression” of intent. In fact, in Watts, the defendant allegedly stated: “If they ever make 
me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.” Some might argue—
perhaps even convincingly—that this was a “serious expression of an intent to commit an 
act of unlawful violence to a particular individual” (Virginia, 2003, pp. 359).   
Public Employee Cases 
To understand a short history of freedom of speech for public employees, we will 
review three of the most important cases, Pickering v. Board of Education, Connick v. 
Myers, and Garcetti v. Cabellos. 
Pickering v. Board of Education 
In 1961, the Board of Education of the Township School District in Will County, 
Illinois, presented voters in its district with a bond issue. The district asked for 
approximately $5 million to build two new high schools. Voters approved the bond. The 
Board then presented proposals for additional tax revenues to support the two schools.  
Voters rejected the proposals. After the defeat, a teacher in the district, Marvin Pickering, 
wrote a letter to the editor of the local paper, charging that the district had not been 
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honest with voters about how money for the schools was being spent. Pickering claimed 
that the Board was spending more money on athletics than on education, and he also 
alleged that the Superintendent actively sought to prevent teachers in the district from 
speaking out about the referenda. Pickering signed the letter as “a citizen, taxpayer and 
voter, not as a teacher, since that freedom has been taken from the teachers by the 
administration” (Pickering, 1968, p. 578). 
The district responded by firing Pickering. The Board claimed that his letter was 
“detrimental to the efficient operation and administration of the schools of the district” 
and stated that several of the allegations in the letter were false (Pickering, 1968, p. 564). 
Pickering sued the Board in state court and lost. He then appealed to the Illinois Supreme 
Court and again lost (Pickering, 1967). The Illinois Supreme Court wrote in its decision: 
“By choosing to teach in the public schools, plaintiff undertook the obligation to refrain 
from conduct which in the absence of such position he would have an undoubted right to 
engage in” (Pickering, 1967, p. 577). The majority stated further, “a teacher who displays 
disrespect toward the Board of Education, incites misunderstanding and distrust of its 
policies, and makes unsupported accusations against the officials is not promoting the 
best interests of his school, and the Board of Education does not abuse its discretion in 
dismissing him” (Pickering, 1967, p. 578). 
Pickering appealed his case to the United States Supreme Court, and in June 
1968, the Court issued its 8-1 decision in his favor. Writing for the majority, Justice 
Thurgood Marshall noted that the deciding factor was a “a balance between the interests 
of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest 
of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs 
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through its employees” (Pickering, 1968, p. 568). The Court determined that Pickering’s 
right to free speech as a citizen on issues of public interest or importance could not be 
diminished simply because he made comments that were viewed negatively by his 
employer. Furthermore, the Court noted that it was “apparent that the threat of dismissal 
from public employment is nonetheless a potent means of inhibiting speech” (Pickering, 
1968, p. 574).  
Connick v. Myers 
In the 1983 case of Connick v. Myers, the Supreme Court further established its 
position that public employees are protected when commenting on matters of public 
interest, but in doing so it muddied the definition of “public,” creating confusion in the 
wake of its decision. Sheila Myers was an assistant district attorney working in the office 
of District Attorney Harry Connick, when her supervisor Chief Assistant District 
Attorney Dennis Waldron, informed her that she was being transferred to a different 
section of the criminal court. Upset by this news, Myers challenged the transfer and in 
addition informed Waldron of her displeasure with certain office procedures. Waldron 
responded that he did not believe that others in the office shared her opinion. Myers 
claimed that, at this point, she informed Waldron that she would research his assertion 
and collect information from others in the office. Myers drafted a questionnaire and 
distributed it to several other assistant district attorneys in the office. The survey included 
questions regarding the fairness of transfer policies, the handling of office grievances, 
office morale, the level of confidence inspired by specifically named co-workers, and 
whether employees felt pressure to work on political campaigns for candidates supported 
by the District Attorney’s office.   
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Connick fired Myers, claiming that she had refused the transfer, and that the 
distribution of the questionnaire was an act of insubordination. Myers sued on the 
grounds that her actions were protected by the First Amendment and won in federal 
district court (Myers, 1981). Connick appealed to the Fifth Circuit, again losing (Myers, 
1981). He then appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which delivered its decision 
on April 20, 1983. The Court found in favor of Connick on the grounds that the majority 
of the questions on Myers’ survey were not matters of public concern and were 
threatening to the District Attorney’s authority. In its decision, the Court noted that “the 
limited First Amendment interest involved here does not require that Connick tolerate 
action which he reasonably believed would disrupt the office, undermine his authority, 
and destroy close working relationships. Myers’ discharge therefore did not offend the 
First Amendment” (Connick, 1983, p. 154).  
In the dissent, Justice Brennan noted that, applying principles from other cases, 
this case did involve matters of public concern because the survey included questions 
regarding office morale, which would undoubtedly affect job performance. He also 
observed that “the Court’s adoption of a far narrower conception of what subjects are of 
public concern” undermines the principle that citizens decide what is in the public 
interest (Connick, 1983, p. 163). Finally, the dissent outlined the chilling consequence of 
upholding the termination of an employee for criticizing her employer. Invoking its prior 
decision in Pickering, in which the Court found that “the threat of dismissal from public 
employment is . . . a potent means of inhibiting speech” (Pickering, 1968, p.574), 
Brennan emphasized the importance of the public to engage in free and open debate, 
particularly on issues of government. He concluded by observing that the Court’s earlier 
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test in Tinker should have been utilized to determine whether the speech in question 
“materially and substantially” disrupted or interfered with the operations of the work 
environment, as opposed to merely finding it uncomfortable, unpleasant or annoying 
(Connick, 1983). 
Garcetti v. Ceballos 
 Connick v. Myers set the stage for Garcetti v. Ceballos, the most distressing 
public employment case to date related to protection of free speech for public employees. 
Richard Ceballos was a deputy district attorney in Los Angeles, who was working for Gil 
Garcetti, the District Attorney at that time. Ceballos drafted a memo to his superiors in 
which he outlined serious reservations regarding the validity of a search warrant affidavit.  
He shared concerns that the information offered to procure the search warrant was 
inaccurate, and recommended dismissing the case. Ceballos met with his superiors and, 
ultimately, the District Attorney’s office decided to pursue prosecution in the case. 
Ceballos subsequently opened a grievance, claiming there was retaliation against him for 
his memo. He asserted that he was reassigned to a new position, transferred to a different 
courthouse, and denied a promotion. The grievance was denied. 
 Ceballos sued in federal district court claiming that his First Amendment rights 
had been violated through retaliatory actions as a direct result of his memo (Ceballos, 
2004). While his superiors denied those claims, the decision in the case was that Ceballos 
was not entitled to First Amendment protection in relation to a memo written in the 
course of executing his job duties. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Ceballos 
wrote the memo “as a citizen upon matters of public concern.”   
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 In a bitterly divided 5-4 decision, the United States Supreme Court held that the 
test of rights in this case was whether Ceballos acted as a public employee or a private 
citizen in writing the memo. The majority held that Ceballos acted as a public employee 
and, therefore, remained subject to disciplinary action based on job performance. In 
essence, the Court was saying that public employees have no free speech protection when 
they make statements critical of their employers. This ruling applies to all government 
employees, and although the court did not specifically address implications for higher  
education in the ruling, Justice David Souter warned in his dissent that the decision could 
affect academic freedom. In response, Justice Kennedy wrote that the Court “need not . . . 
decide whether the analysis we conduct today would apply in the same manner to a case 
involving speech related to scholarship or teaching” (Garcetti, 2006, p.425).   
In fact, colleges and universities did take notice of the ruling and—recognizing 
this powerful threat—several took action. At the University of Minnesota, the Faculty 
Senate changed the Board of Regents policy on Academic Freedom and Responsibility in 
2009 to define academic freedom as the “freedom, without institutional discipline or 
restraint, to discuss all relevant matters in the classroom . . . and to speak or write on  
matters related to professional duties and the functioning of the University” (UMBOR, 
2014). The University of Wisconsin-Madison amended its Faculty Policies and 
Procedures to include specific language that “includes the right to speak or write—as a 
private citizen or within the context of one's activities as an employee of the university—
without institutional discipline or restraint on matters of public concern as well as on 
matters related to professional duties, the functioning of the university, and university 
positions and policies” (Secretary of the Faculty, 2014). Similar changes occurred at 
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institutions across the country, including in California, Delaware, Florida, and 
Pennsylvania (Clayton, 2014). 
If not Tinker, what is the standard? 
Whereas Tinker is too restrictive for higher education because it applies to minors 
in an environment where the school is acting in place of the parent, the “true threat” 
doctrine suggests a more appropriate standard because it offers adult students on 
campuses the same protections they would enjoy were they not enrolled in college. As 
the Supreme Court noted in Papish, “the First Amendment leaves no room for the 
operation of a dual standard in the academic community with respect to the content of 
speech” (Papish, 1973, p. 671). 
Based on all of the information cited above—the histories of Tinker and its 
closely related cases, the differences between PK-12 education and higher education, 
legal precedents for speech rights in the higher education context, and public employee 
speech rights—it is my determination that students in the higher education setting are 
entitled to the same freedom of expression as any other American citizen. Public 
employment cases do not apply in this context, as it is implausible that the general public 
would accept that a college student would be speaking as a “public employee” on behalf 
of a college or university. It is equally implausible that a single student’s speech or online 
comments could “disrupt” the campus environment, “undermine” the institution’s 
authority, or “destroy close working relationships” on campus.  
While an argument certainly could be made that Tinker could apply as the 
standard if it were properly applied as written, and if none of its subsequent, related 
restrictions were employed, this seems a more laborious approach.  The more direct way 
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of thinking about the issue is to recognize that higher education students enjoy the same 
rights to freedom of expression as any other citizen, but my determination relates only to 
the control of the content of speech—not to the ability of institutions to place reasonable 
time, place, and manner restrictions on speech. In my view, all legitimate disciplinary 
requirements in the college setting are either already addressed through the law itself, in 
the form of “true threat” and other legal limitations on speech, or can be addressed 
through these time, place, and manner restrictions. 
Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions 
The United States Supreme Court, through several court cases, has established 
time, place, and manner (TPM) restrictions. The purpose of TPM restrictions is to protect 
individual freedom of expression while also ensuring the safety of the public as a whole.  
The Court established four tests in Ward v. Rock Against Racism (1989) to safeguard the 
constitutionality of TPM restrictions: 
• They must be content neutral, 
• They must be narrowly tailored, 
• They must serve a significant governmental interest, and 
• They must leave open ample alternative channels of communication 
Examples of TPM restrictions are: 
• Time - No one may “insist upon a street meeting in the middle of Times Square at 
the rush hour as a form of freedom of speech” (Cox v. Louisiana, 1965, p. 554). 
 
• Place – The government may limit where individuals are free to express 
themselves, based on the forum for expression. There are three categories of fora:  
1)  traditional public, such as parks and sidewalks, 2)  limited public, such as 
Capitol grounds, courthouses and grounds, and public universities, and 3)  non-
public, which is private property or public property dedicated to a primary 
mission other than individual expression, such as military bases or county jails. 
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The government has the most authority to limit expression on non-public 
property. 
 
• Manner – These restrictions relate to the type of speech employed. A common 
example is flag burning, which is a form of symbolic speech protected under the 
law. An example of manner restriction comes from the 1984 case Clark v. 
Community for Creative Non-Violence. The Supreme Court found in favor of the 
National Park Service and denied protestors’ request to sleep in parks not 
specifically designated for overnight camping, arguing that allowing such 
behavior would be “inimical” to the mission of keeping “the parks in the heart of 
the Capital in an attractive and intact condition” (Clark, 1984, p. 296). 
 
Again, my arguments pertain only to the control of the content of speech, and not to 
permissible TPM restrictions on speech. 
 To be sure, a university must be able to control certain student speech. Students 
cannot, for example, be permitted to stand and recite poetry in the middle of a chemistry 
professor’s lecture. Similarly, student protests must not prevent other students accessing 
their own classes. These sorts of concerns can be addressed through narrowly tailored—
and constitutional—TPM restrictions. 
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How Do Social Media Intersect with the Law and Conduct Codes? 
Having determined that Tinker is not the appropriate standard to apply in higher 
education, and that college and university students enjoy the same freedom of expression 
rights as all other American citizens, we will investigate now the history of incidents on 
campuses involving free speech rights and social media, and explore the current climate 
for these cases. 
 Across the country, there have been incidents involving the intersection of 
freedom of expression and conduct codes on campus, but the advent of social media has 
added a new dimension to the discussion. For example, a basic question would involve 
defining “off campus” and “on campus” in the context of social media. Before social 
media platforms, it was obvious when a student was “on campus” versus “off campus,” 
as this determination involved the actual physical location of the person in question. 
Social media has changed that view for many people, raising questions about how 
conduct codes relate to “virtual” presence.   
It is relatively easy to understand the concerns that arise with respect to the effects 
of social media on freedom of expression. Social media platforms such as Facebook and 
Twitter challenge our perceptions of speech, particularly as related to scope and 
influence, and endurance and permanence. Social media has the same immediacy factor 
as verbal speech; an individual can make a statement that enters the atmosphere instantly. 
But, unlike verbal speech, a posted or tweeted comment can be viewed by anyone with 
access, and the comment may linger forever on the chosen platform. 
It is axiomatic that colleges and universities should remember that the First 
Amendment exists to prevent entities—including the government—from prohibiting 
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speech because they do not agree with the sentiment being expressed. Furthermore, while 
the Supreme Court has imposed limited restrictions on speech in the PK-12 public 
schools, it has stated explicitly in several opinions that academic freedom is paramount 
on the college campus, and that the balancing test for those institutions differs 
fundamentally from the PK-12 system. The Court has noted repeatedly that institutions 
do not have the same authority to govern off-campus speech that they do with on-campus 
speech. In both Hazelwood (1988) and Morse (2007), the Court wrote explicitly on this 
subject, noting that schools could not censor speech outside of the school context. The 
issue, of course, lies in the definition of “off-campus” when dealing with virtual speech.  
The Disintegration of “Off Campus” in the PK-12 setting 
Starting in 2007, with Wisniewski v. Board of Education, more cases have 
emerged to challenge the definition of “off-campus” as it relates to virtual speech, 
thereby allowing institutions to intrude into their students’ off-campus, virtual lives. 
These cases have resulted in findings where speech that took place online was viewed as 
substantially disruptive to the school environment because of the specific nature of the 
speech.  The following four cases are examples of this crumbling classification, each 
utilizing a different mode of social media. 
Wisniewski v. Board of Education 
 In 2001, 8th-grader Aaron Wisniewski sent instant messages to his “buddies” on 
AOL. Like most social media platforms, AOL IM allows its users to create both a “screen 
name” and an “icon.” According to the Second Circuit transcript:  “Aaron’s IM icon was 
a small drawing of a pistol firing a bullet at a person’s head, above which were dots 
representing splattered blood. Beneath the drawing appeared the words ‘Kill Mr. 
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VanderMolen.’ Philip VanderMolen was Aaron’s English teacher at the time” 
(Wisniewski, 2007, p. 36). Eventually, another student brought the icon to the attention of 
VanderMolen, who in turn reported it to school district principals. The principals 
informed the police, the superintendent of the district, and Aaron’s parents. Aaron was 
suspended from school for five days, and Philip VanderMolen was reassigned to a 
different class.   
 Over the course of his suspension and after returning to school, Aaron was the 
subject of both a police investigation and a psychological evaluation. Both parties 
determined that Aaron’s actions were intended as a joke and that he posed no real threat 
to VanderMolen. The criminal case against Aaron was closed. But Aaron remained 
subject to a hearing with the superintendent to discuss a possible long-term suspension.  
At that hearing, Aaron was charged with “endangering the health and welfare of other 
students and staff at the school” and suspended for one semester. Despite the fact that the 
speech took place off school grounds—and even with the findings of the police 
investigation and the psychological evaluation—the hearing officer found that Aaron’s 
“intent [was] irrelevant.”   
 Aaron’s parents filed suit in federal district court on the grounds that Aaron’s icon 
was protected by his First Amendment rights. Not only did the court find in favor of the 
hearing officer, but it also went one step further in determining that Aaron’s icon 
constituted a “true threat,” in contrast to the police investigation and the psychological 
evaluation results. 
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 Aaron’s parents appealed to the Second Circuit, which affirmed the finding of the 
district court. In its decision, the appellate court rejected the “true threat” argument, 
instead favoring application of Tinker. The Court stated that it seemed inevitable that 
Aaron’s icon would come to the attention of school officials and would “materially and 
substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school.” Furthermore, the Court noted 
“the fact that Aaron’s creation and transmission of the IM icon occurred away from 
school property does not necessarily insulate him from school discipline” (Wisniewski, 
2007, p. 39).   
Doninger v. Niehoff 
 In 2007, Avery Doninger, a junior at Lewis Mills High School, had a dispute with 
her school principal over the postponement of a school event and emails sent by members 
of the Student Council directing concerned parties to contact the principal about that 
event. While the principal left their meeting with the impression that the matter was 
resolved, instead, later than evening, Avery posted to her livejournal.com blog about the 
situation, referring to “douchebags in central office” and encouraging people to continue 
contacting the principal’s office in order to “piss her off more.” The blog was accessible 
to the public, and several Lewis Mills students commented on it— including one 
comment characterizing the principal as a “dirty whore.” The principal learned of the 
blog content several days later and disciplined Avery by refusing to allow her to run for 
senior class secretary, claiming that her behavior was not “appropriate” for a class 
officer. 
 Doninger’s mother filed suit, and the case was eventually decided in the Second 
Circuit. Although the court noted that the United States Supreme Court had “yet to speak 
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on the scope of a school’s authority to regulate expression that, like Avery’s, does not 
occur on school grounds or at a school-sponsored event,” it pointed out that Wisniewski  
allowed schools to employ Tinker to discipline students for speech occurring off campus 
when it “would foreseeably create a risk of substantial disruption within the school 
environment.”  Ultimately, the court determined that the school did not violate Avery’s 
First Amendment rights (Doninger, 2011, p. 48). 
Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools 
 During her senior year of high school in 2005, Kara Kowalski created a MySpace 
page entitled “S.A.S.H.” which, according to differing accounts, stood for either 
“Students Against Sluts Herpes” or “Students Against Shay’s Herpes.” Kowalski and 
Shay were fellow students and Shay was the primary subject of posts on the page. 
Roughly two-dozen schoolmates joined the page, and posted comments connecting Shay 
with sexually transmitted diseases. Within hours, Shay became aware of the page, and the 
following morning Shay’s father filed a harassment complaint with the high school.   
 After consulting with the school board, Principal Ronald Stephens opened an 
investigation and interviewed students who had joined the page. Upon completing their 
inquiry, Stephens and Vice Principal Becky Harden determined that Kowalski had 
violated school policy prohibiting “harassment, bullying, and intimidation.” They 
imposed several penalties, including:  1) a 10 day suspension, 2) a 90-day “social 
suspension,” during which Kowalski was banned from attending school events in which 
she was not directly participating, and 3) her immediate removal from the cheerleading 
squad. The Superintendent reduced her school suspension to five days after an appeal by 
her father. 
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 Kowalski sued in federal district court, which found in favor of the school district.  
She then appealed to the Fourth Circuit, which relied on Tinker in upholding the district 
court’s ruling. The Fourth Circuit found that “there is surely a limit to the scope of a high 
school’s interest in the order, safety, and well-being of its students when the speech at 
issue originates outside the schoolhouse gate. But we need not fully define that limit here, 
as we are satisfied that the speech . . . was sufficiently strong to justify the action taken 
by school officials in carrying out their role as the trustees of the student body’s well-
being” (Kowalski, 2011, p. 573). 
D.J.M v. Hannibal Public School District 
 In the 2011 case D.J.M v. Hannibal Public School District, the parents of Dylan J. 
Mardis, identified as D.J.M., brought suit against the school district over a case involving 
instant messages. In 2006, as a 10th-grader, Dylan sent messages to a friend in which he 
discussed getting a gun and shooting students at their school. The friend shared this 
information with the school principal who in turn notified police. Dylan was suspended 
initially for ten days, but the suspension was later lengthened to the remainder of the 
school year. A federal district court judge found that Dylan’s comments were both a “true 
threat” and a material and substantial disruption. Dylan appealed to the Eighth Circuit 
Court and lost. The court decided “it was reasonably foreseeable that D.J.M.’s threats 
about shooting specific students in school would be brought to the attention of school 
authorities and create a risk of substantial disruption within the school environment” 
(D.J.M., 2011, p. 766). Given the nature of this case, the court also observed: “The 
widespread use of instant messaging by students in and out of school presents new First 
Amendment challenges for school officials [and] . . . [s]chool officials cannot 
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constitutionally reach out to discover, monitor, or punish any type of out of school 
speech” (D.J.M., 2011, p. 765). 
Conduct Creep  
While we may view these acts as distasteful, offensive, and even alarming, they 
mark the beginning of what I refer to as “conduct creep”—the gradual movement of 
school conduct codes into broader areas of students’ lives. The prevalence of social 
media brings an entirely new aspect to already complex free speech cases, and its 
permanency and easy accessibility allows for a level of student scrutiny not previously 
possible.   
While I have established that Tinker is not the appropriate standard for college 
campuses, even were that standard to be applied, many campus conduct codes and 
administrative actions taken on college campuses would fail the balancing test of 
“substantial disruption.” If one stops to think of how much it would take to hinder the 
operations of a large and complex university, it quickly becomes clear that the vast 
majority of the posts we see regularly on Facebook, Twitter, and other social media sites 
could not accomplish that herculean task.  More often, institutions are using their conduct 
codes to chill the free speech rights of students and employees posting about the school 
itself.   
Perhaps my greatest fear regarding campus conduct creep and social media is that 
institutions will move toward a climate of privacy waivers. Currently, students are 
routinely asked to sign public relations waivers as part of their admissions packets, 
allowing colleges and universities to use pictures or videos taken of them in public 
venues as part of marketing materials. What if the next generation of admissions packets 
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included a “privacy waiver,” asking students to sign on the dotted line and agree to the 
monitoring of their social media sites in accordance with the behavior standards set forth 
in a student conduct code? At first glance, this seems far-fetched; however, we have 
already seen this type of action at the PK-12 level with student random drug testing. 
There are districts across the country where student athletes must submit to this testing in 
order to participate in extra-curricular athletics. While this is not entirely analogous, as 
drug use is illegal, it makes the point that often we are asked to surrender our First 
Amendment rights to participate in voluntary activities. Perhaps more analogous were 
cases in which high school and college athletes were required to give social media 
passwords to their respective schools, or in which they were required to submit to a ban 
on all social media use (Bentley, 2012). Perhaps the privacy waiver is not so far-fetched 
an idea after all. 
Campus disciplinary actions involving social media 
Universities are just starting to alter conduct codes to include sections relating 
directly to social media use, some of which are so broad and vague in nature as to be 
almost unenforceable. While there are hundreds of cases to serve as examples, the cases 
outlined below utilize differing types of social media, including Facebook, Twitter, and 
YouTube.  
University of Kansas 
At the University of Kansas, the Kansas Board of Regents adopted a social media policy 
for faculty and staff that could be characterized as among the most restrictive in the 
country. The policy was initially discussed in response to a tweet by a KU professor  
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about the Washington Navy Yard shooting which quickly gained national attention: 
• The blood is on the hands of the #NRA. Next time, let it be YOUR sons and 
daughters. Shame on you. May God damn you. 
 
Professor David Guth was suspended with pay for approximately seven months as a 
result of the controversial tweet (Lowe, 2014).  
While the social media policy adopted by the Board includes an opening 
statement on the importance of academic freedom, it includes broad language (citing 
support of the United States Supreme Court as its basis) allowing disciplinary action for 
university employees who incite violence or breach peace through speech, or whose 
comments on social media are “contrary to the best interests of the employer.” It further 
outlines that disciplinary action is appropriate in cases where the speech “impairs 
discipline by superiors or harmony among co-workers” or “has a detrimental impact on 
close working relationships for which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary.” 
The policy does outline that determining action for such speech would be subject to the 
balancing test of “the employee’s right as a citizen to speak on matters of public 
concern.” In other words, the policy’s authors have paid close attention to the types of 
cases outlined here and the associated consequences for public employees (Lowe, 2014). 
 In a May 14, 2014 article posted on the KCUR (Kansas City Public Media) 
webpage, Professor Ron Barrett-Gonzalez, head of the local chapter of the American 
Association of University Professors reported that “many professors no longer place their 
lectures on YouTube or Facebook” and that “they have toned down teaching on 
controversial subjects like politics, gun rights and abortion” (Lowe, 2014). 
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 At this time, no such language has been added to the University of Kansas “Code 
of Student Rights and Responsibilities (Student Code).” 
Montclair State University 
 In October 2012, a student at Montclair State University in New Jersey received a 
“University No Contact Order” after he posted what it deemed “offensive” comments on 
a YouTube page. The UNCO ordered Joseph Aziz not to have any contact with the 
student whose video he commented on and also not to post about that student on any 
other social media outlet.  When Aziz subsequently posted comments referring to the 
student on a private Facebook page, the University suspended him and barred him from 
campus with the threat of arrest should he be discovered on university property.  FIRE 
(Foundation for Individual Rights in Education) contacted MSU’s President, Susan Cole, 
who referred the matter to University Counsel. At that point, the suspension was reversed 
(Montclair, 2013). 
Syracuse University – Matthew Werenczak 
 In January 2012, Syracuse University disciplined Matthew Werenczak for a 
comment he posted on his Facebook page: 
• Syracuse NAACP rep: ‘we need to start hiring our teachers from historically 
black colleges.’ Mind you two white tutors were in the room. I’ll let you take your 
own inference from that. Because that sort of stuff matters. 
 
Werenczak, a student in the School of Education, was tutoring in the public schools as 
part of his teaching program in the School of Education. After posting the comment, 
Werenczak received a letter informing him that he could be “administratively removed 
from the SOE,” and offering him the options of withdrawing from the SOE or completing 
a series of requirements, including counseling for “anger management,” taking an 
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additional course on cultural diversity, and writing a paper on his “personal growth” as a 
result of completing the counseling and the cultural diversity course. The letter stated 
that, after completion of these requirements, a committee would review his paper and 
then meet with him to ascertain his readiness to continue in the program. Werenczak 
completed all requirements, but experienced significant delays in his readmission 
assessment. He contacted FIRE, which sent a letter to Syracuse University Chancellor 
Nancy Cole, and upon receiving no response from the University by its requested 
deadline, proceeded to publish the details of the case on its website, thefire.org. FIRE 
states on its website that “within hours” of posting the case on its website, Matthew 
Werenczak was readmitted to his program (Syracuse, 2012). 
Syracuse University – Len Audaer 
Another case at Syracuse University involved Len Audaer, a law student who was 
informed by email on October 15, 2010, of an investigation into his possible violation of 
SU’s Code of Student Conduct. A few days later, Audaer met with Associate Professor of 
Law Gregory Germain and Senior Assistant Dean for Student Life Tomás Gonzalez. 
During this meeting, Audaer was allegedly informed that he was being investigated for 
harassment, with a possible second inquiry related to the “use of electronic resources for 
the purposes of committing harassment.” Audaer also claimed that Professor Germain 
stated outright that he was “strongly inclined to prosecute him” on these charges. The day 
after the meeting, Audaer emailed both parties, outlining his understanding of the 
meeting and requesting their confirmation of his account from each of them. While both 
responded, neither would confirm his report of the events of the meeting (Syracuse, 
2010). 
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 At issue were Audaer’s anonymous contributions to a satirical blog at the SU 
entitled, “SOCULitis.” The blog authors are not listed on the site, and there is a specific 
disclaimer noting that the blog is satirical in nature and similar to the satirical news 
journal, “The Onion.” 
 Audaer turned to FIRE, which sent a letter to Syracuse University Chancellor 
Nancy Cole on October 25, 2010. FIRE received a response dated November 1, 2010, 
explaining that the College of Law had received “written complaints” that accused 
Audaer of a possible violation of the Code of Student Conduct and, in accordance with 
the policies of the College of Law, an investigation was being held to determine the 
veracity of those complaints. After approximately three months, Syracuse dropped its 
case against Audaer in February 2011 (Victory, 2011). During that three-month period, 
Syracuse was named by FIRE as “one of the worst universities in the nation for free 
speech” (Lukianoff, 2011). 
St. Augustine’s College 
 In April 2011, Roman Caple, a student at St. Augustine’s College (known as St. 
Augustine’s University since 2012) was informed that he was barred from participating in 
commencement as a result of a “negative social media exchange during the institution’s 
recovery” from a tornado that had struck the campus earlier that month. The College 
maintained that Caple not only posted comments intended for the “sole purpose of 
inciting to react,” but also indicated in an April 29, 2011, press release that “there were 
other incidents” that played a role in the decision that could not be discussed “because of 
FERPA (Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act) constraints.” This is a particularly 
interesting example because SAC is a private institution, not bound by the First 
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Amendment. However, in a letter from FIRE Vice President of Programs, Adam Kissel, 
he quotes SAC’s “Student Conduct Code and Student Judicial Manual” as stating at the 
time that “students enjoy the same basic rights and are bound by the same responsibilities 
to respect the rights of others, as are all citizens.” (Since this case, SAC has changed 
substantially its Code of Conduct.) Caple was unable to find relief through SAC channels 
and filed suit on July 8, 2011. The case was settled out of court in December of that year 
(College, 2011; Stenovec, 2011). 
Michigan State University 
 In 2008, Michigan State University student Kara Spencer was disciplined for 
allegedly violating the school’s “spam” policy for email. Spencer sent an email to 
selected faculty on campus regarding a proposed change to the institution’s academic 
calendar in response to which she received an email from Randall Hall, of the Michigan 
State University Network Acceptable Use Policy Compliance office, informing her that 
she was being investigated for a “possible violation of the AUP (Acceptable Use 
Policy).” A hearing was held, and Spencer was found guilty of violating MSU’s 
“Guidelines Regarding Bulk E-mailing by Internal Users of MSUnet” and received a 
written warning in her student file. After this disciplinary action, an open letter of protest 
signed by thirteen civil liberties organizations was sent to University President Lou Anna 
K. Simon. Shortly thereafter, Spencer received a letter informing her that the complainant 
had dropped the charges and the University was therefore withdrawing all charges related 
to the incident (MSU, 2008).  
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Catawba Valley Community College  
 At Catawba Valley Community College in Hickory, North Carolina, student Marc 
Bechtol was suspended without a hearing for posting a message on Facebook criticizing 
the College’s decision to partner with a financial institution in order to provide debit 
cards to students. Bechtol questioned the decision on his own Facebook page, and then 
posted the following message on the institution’s Facebook page: 
• Did anyone else get a bunch of credit card spam in their CVCC inbox today? So, 
did CVCC sell our names to banks, or did Higher One? I think we should register 
CVCC’s address with every porn site known to man. Anyone know any good 
viruses to send them? 
OK, maybe that would be a slight overreaction. 
 
Approximately one week after posting this message, Bechtol received a letter from 
Cynthia Coulter, the Executive Office of Student Services, informing him that he was in 
violation of the student conduct policy because his behavior in posting the message was 
“contrary to the best interest of the CVCC community.” The letter indicated that Bechtol 
was suspended for the entire fall 2011 and spring 2012 semesters, and that he would be 
withdrawn from his fall courses effective immediately. He was also barred from all 
CVCC campuses for the entire period of the suspension. Bechtol appealed his suspension 
and contacted FIRE, which sent a letter to the CVCC President Garrett Hinshaw and 
issued a press release about the matter. Within two weeks of these actions, the suspension 
was lifted and Bechtol was allowed to finish his program at CVCC with the condition 
that he would continue his education with online classes, agree to be blocked from 
CVCC’s social media network, and “publicly express regret” for his words (Marc 
Bechtol, 2011). 
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Murakowski v. University of Delaware 
 The 2008 case of Murakowski v. University of Delaware involved a student who 
posted violent, racist, and sexually explicit stories on a website he created using the 
University’s server space. The narratives discussed murder, rape, and severe violence 
toward women, among other things. The website was public, and some female students 
who lived in the same residence hall as Murakowski became aware of it. One of them 
shared it with her brother, who in turn lodged a complaint with the University. Other 
complaints were registered, in which female students reported feeling very uncomfortable 
around Murakowski. 
 University officials contacted Murakowski’s father, who worked on campus, 
requesting that he and his son report the next day to the office of Associate Vice 
President for Student Life Cynthia Cummings. At that meeting, Cummings presented her 
concerns to Murakowski, along with a letter outlining a series of disciplinary actions 
including: 
• charges of violation of the University’s “Responsible Computing Policy,”  
• removal from classes and from the residence hall until a psychiatric assessment 
was completed, 
 
• a letter from the mental health professional completing that assessment indicating 
that Murakowski posed no threat to himself or others, and 
 
• a waiver granting Cummings permission to speak with said mental health 
professional about the conclusion and recommendations. 
 
Over the next month, Murakowski underwent the psychiatric evaluation. He and the 
University then engaged in a series of hearings and appeals that ultimately resulted in his 
suspension from the University and his banishment from campus. 
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 Murakowski sued in federal district court on the grounds of violation of his First 
and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court found no Fourteenth Amendment due 
process violation. On the issue of First Amendment rights, the court noted prior decisions 
made in Tinker (1969), Watts (1969), Healy (1972), Fraser (1986), Hazelwood (1988), 
and Morse (2007), along with cases related to the “true threat” doctrine that are not 
covered in this paper. While the court noted that Murakowski’s statements were not 
“conditional,” in the sense that “he suggests that he intends to rape, kidnap and murder,” 
it found that his writings did not constitute a “true threat” (Murakowski, 2008, p. 590).  
Furthermore, the court noted that the University was unable to prove that his postings 
caused a “material disruption,” observing that there was “no evidence that his writings 
were of interest to other students or a topic of conversation on campus even in light of the 
events at Virginia Tech” (Murakowski, 2008, p. 592). In the end, the court found in favor 
of Murakowski on the First Amendment grounds, and in favor of the University on the 
Fourteenth Amendment grounds (Murakowski, 2008).  
Professional Programs and the Law 
 Over the last five years, several legal cases arose in which students enrolled in 
“professional programs” such as nursing, education, and mortuary science, stood accused 
of violating the standards of those fields. Here, we will examine three of those cases, 
illustrating a synthesis of all of the elements discussed thus far.  
Yoder v. University of Louisville 
Nina Yoder was a student in the University of Louisville School of Nursing. In 
2009, she began posting candid reactions to her experiences with a pregnant patient.  As 
part of her studies, Yoder was required to find an expectant mother to follow through the 
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birthing process. After the patient gave birth, Yoder blogged about the entire experience 
on her MySpace page. Another student in the class brought the blog to the attention of the 
course instructor, who in turn contacted the Associate Dean of the School of Nursing. 
The Associate Dean reviewed the information with the Dean, and the two of them 
concluded that Yoder had violated the School of Nursing Honor Code, the individual 
course’s “confidentiality statement,” the course consent form signed by the birth mother, 
as well as the standards of the nursing profession.   
 The Associate Dean met with Yoder, who confirmed that she had written the blog 
posts in question. Yoder was then dismissed from the program. She unsuccessfully 
petitioned for an internal review of the dismissal. Yoder then filed suit in federal district 
court. The court ruled in her favor, but its decision was not made on constitutional 
grounds. In its decision, the court outlined its reasoning: “A fundamental rule of judicial 
restraint requires that federal courts, prior to reaching any constitutional questions, must 
first consider any nonconstitutional grounds for a decision” (Yoder, 2009, p. 14). The 
court viewed it as a contractual issue and determined that Yoder violated neither the 
Honor Code nor the Confidentiality Agreement. Additionally, the court noted that, while 
it found the blog posts to be “generally distasteful” and “objectively offensive,” they 
were not vulgar by legal definition (Yoder, 2009, p. 17). 
 The University of Louisville appealed, and the Sixth Circuit overturned the 
district court’s decision on the grounds that Yoder argued that her First Amendment 
rights were violated because the Honor Code and the Confidentiality Agreement were 
unconstitutional, and the district court should have ruled on that basis. In its decision, the 
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Sixth Circuit noted, “neither the Supreme Court nor a panel of our circuit has considered 
whether schools can regulate off-campus, online speech by students” (Yoder, 2013, p. 
545). It also observed, “other circuits have come to conflicting conclusions and permitted 
schools to regulate off-campus, online speech” (Yoder, 2013, p. 545). It seems to me that 
the most important lessons to be learned from it are:  1) the status of First Amendment 
rights in higher education cases is confused and murky at best, and 2) the subject of 
waivers of personal rights by students—even for students enrolled in “professional” 
programs—deserves deeper exploration by our justice system (Yoder, 2013). 
Snyder v. Millersville University 
 While the circumstances in Snyder are similar to those in Yoder, the outcome was 
quite different. Stacy Snyder was a student in the Millersville University School of 
Education when she posted about her experience as a student teacher on her MySpace 
page and included a picture of herself “wearing a pirate hat and holding a plastic cup,” 
which she captioned “drunken pirate” (Snyder, 2008, p. 15). This incident occurred after 
Snyder had received evaluations in which concerns about her communications were 
noted and warnings about referencing cooperating students or teachers on social media 
sites. After an internal review process, the School of Education deemed Snyder 
“unsatisfactory” in the category of professionalism and informed her that she could not 
graduate with such a rating. She was informed that she would receive an English degree 
instead.   
 After a somewhat lengthy and confusing legal journey, Snyder filed suit in federal 
district court, where she lost. In this case, a deciding factor was whether Snyder was a 
“student” or an “employee,” and whether Tinker, Connick, Pickering, or Garcetti was the 
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appropriate standard. The court noted that Snyder did not attend any classes during the 
student-teaching period, that she essentially acted as a full-time teacher, and that she 
followed the calendar of the school at which she was student teaching. Furthermore, the 
court observed that Snyder viewed herself as a teacher and not a student. Ultimately, the 
court determined that Snyder was akin to a public employee, and so her posts were not 
subject to the same protections as student speech (Snyder, 2008). 
Tatro v. University of Minnesota 
In 2012, a legal case emerged which forced the standards of Tinker and “true 
threat,” and the issue of social media before the courts, Amanda Tatro v. University of 
Minnesota. For the first time, the courts seemingly had to grapple with these multiple 
issues in the context of higher education. 
Amanda Tatro was a junior in the mortuary science program at the University of 
Minnesota – Twin Cities when she posted on Facebook about her experiences as a 
student. In these posts she shared information about the anatomy and embalming lab in 
which she had contact with donated human cadavers, and described  having dark thoughts 
that involved violent acts. As a member of the mortuary science program, Tatro received 
information about program rules related to work with human cadavers, and she signed an 
“Anatomy Bequest Program Human Anatomy Access Orientation Disclosure Form” 
stating that she had received this information. As part of this orientation, students are 
apprised as to respectful treatment of cadavers and are also informed that “blogging” 
about the anatomy lab is prohibited. Tatro and her lab colleagues were notified that the 
term “blogging” also referred to the use of Facebook and Twitter.   
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 As stated in the case opinion, “on December 11, 2009, Tatro’s Facebook activity 
was brought to the attention of the Mortuary Science Program Director” (Tatro, 2012, p. 
513). Of specific concern were four posts that she had made on Facebook: 
• Amanda Beth Tatro Gets to play, I mean dissect, Bernie today. Let’s see if I can 
have a lab void of reprimanding and having my scalpel taken away. Perhaps if I 
just hide it in my sleeve… (November 12, 2009) 
 
• Amanda Beth Tatro Is looking forward to Monday’s embalming therapy as well 
as a rumored opportunity to aspirate. Give me room, lots of aggression to be taken 
out with a trocar. (December 6, 2009) 
 
• Amanda Beth Tatro Who knew embalming lab was so cathartic! I still want to 
stab a certain someone in the throat with a trocar though. Hmm…perhaps I will 
spend the evening updating my “Death List #5” and making friends with the 
crematory guy. I do know the code… (December 7, 2009) 
 
• Amanda Beth Tatro Realized with great sadness that my best friend, Bernie, will 
no longer be with me as of Friday next week. I wish to accompany him to the 
retort. Now where will I go or who will I hang out with when I need to gather my 
sanity? Bye, bye Bernie. Lock of hair in my pocket. (Undated) 
 
Three days after the program’s director became aware of these posts, he met with 
members of his staff to discuss them. In his testimony he stated that there “was a lot of 
fear” regarding the posts, specifically those about stabbing someone (Tatro, 2012, p. 
513). At that point, the Director contacted University Police, and they met with Tatro. 
During this time, there seemed to be some confusion and miscommunication regarding 
Tatro’s status in the program. She left the meeting under the impression that she was 
suspended, and set about contacting news media outlets. This generated public scrutiny of 
the program by family members of those who had donated their bodies to the program. 
Nevertheless, the Office of Student Conduct and Academic Integrity (OSCAI) advised 
Tatro that she could return to the program and complete her courses and final exams. 
After finals were completed, however, Tatro was informed that the instructor of her 
	   48	  
anatomy lab had submitted a formal complaint to OSCAI charging that Tatro had 
violated the policies outlined in the “Anatomy Bequest Program Human Anatomy Access 
Orientation Disclosure Form” and orientation.   
The Campus Committee on Student Behavior (CCSB) conducted a hearing and 
found a violation of the Student Conduct Code regarding threatening conduct, and also 
found violations of the SCC related to specific “departmental regulations that have been 
posted or publicized” (Tatro, 2012, p. 514). The CCSB imposed sanctions that included a 
failing grade for her anatomy course and required that she complete a directed study in 
ethics, write a letter to the faculty about respect within the program/profession, undergo a 
psychiatric evaluation and submit to any recommendation made as a result of that 
evaluation, and accept probationary student status for the remainder of her undergraduate 
career.   
Tatro appealed the CCSB’s decision to the Provost’s Appeal Committee (PAC) 
on the basis that the University lacked authority to impede her right to free speech, but 
the PAC upheld the decision of the CCSB as well as the sanctions. Tatro then presented 
her case to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, which upheld the sanctions. In its finding, 
the court stated that the University had not violated Tatro’s First Amendment rights.  
In 2011, Tatro appealed her case to the Minnesota Supreme Court, and a three-
judge panel heard the case. Four of the seven justices recused themselves, presumably 
because of personal connections to the University (Lymn, 2012). It is important to note 
that in her original petition, Tatro requested review of only one issue:  “Whether a public 
university violates constitutional free speech rights by disciplining a student for Facebook 
posts that contain satirical commentary and violent fantasy about her school experience 
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but do not identify or threaten anyone.” Based on this one issue, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court accepted the case. It was only later, in her brief on the merits, that Tatro raised 
additional issues regarding the University’s jurisdiction, insufficient evidence to support 
violations, and whether the University had authority to alter a grade. As these issues, 
which related to the University of Minnesota Student Conduct Code were not part of the 
original petition, the court did not review them. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the decision of the court of 
appeals regarding free speech, claiming that “the University did not violate the free 
speech rights of Tatro by imposing sanctions for her Facebook posts that violated  
academic program rules where the academic program rules were narrowly tailored and 
directly related to established professional conduct standards” (Tatro, 2012, p. 511). The 
court also made clear that, because of its position in the decision, neither the Tinker 
standard nor the Hazelwood restriction applied in this case.  It sidestepped the “true 
threat” precedents by claiming that the sanctions imposed were for the totality of Tatro’s 
behaviors and not just for threatening speech (Tatro, 2012).   
A New Standard for Speech? 
According to Amanda Tatro’s attorney, Jordan Kushner, her case was not 
appealed to the United States Supreme Court because of her unexpected death, which 
occurred just one week after the decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court (Simons, 
2012). Since that time, there have been hundreds of blogs and articles discussing the 
Tatro case and positing it as a new standard in the realm of freedom of expression. I 
would argue that it is not, in fact, a new standard and moreover, that the University of 
Minnesota was wrong to take the actions it did against her. Viewed in the context of  the 
	   50	  
history of higher education cases involving freedom of expression, the Tatro case does 
not seem to have created an entirely new standard. Consider Justice Samuel Alito’s 
concurrence in Morse (2007). While Justice Alito clearly agrees with the finding of the 
Court as far as restricting “speech that a reasonable observer would interpret as 
advocating illegal drug use,” he goes on to argue that Morse does not sanction any other 
restrictions on speech aside from those already set by Supreme Court precedent (Morse, 
2007, p. 422). Furthermore, he states, “the opinion of the Court does not endorse the 
broad argument advanced by petitioners and the United States that the First Amendment 
permits public school officials to censor any student speech that interferes with a school’s 
‘educational mission.’ This argument can easily be manipulated in dangerous ways, and I 
would reject it before such abuse occurs” (Morse, 2007, p. 422). Justice Alito thus joined 
“the opinion of the Court with the understanding that the opinion does not endorse any 
further extension” (Morse, 2007, p. 425). Taken in conjunction with the strong statements 
by the Court in Healy, Papish, Widmar, Rosenberger, and Southworth, it seems doubtful 
that, had the Supreme Court heard Tatro v. University of Minnesota, it would have 
considered it a new standard in the history of freedom of expression cases.   
Regarding the actions taken by the University of Minnesota, it is my opinion that 
the original sanctions imposed by the CCSB were unduly harsh and may have been at 
least partially the result of a generational misunderstanding regarding social media. Of 
the five sanctions imposed—a failing grade for her anatomy course, completion of a 
directed study in clinical ethics, requiring that Tatro write a letter to the faculty regarding 
respect within the program and profession, completion of a psychiatric evaluation and 
completion of any recommendation made as a result of that evaluation, and probationary 
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student status for the remainder of her undergraduate career—two of them strike me as 
overreactive in nature and, possibly, actionable.   
First, for the University of Minnesota to change what was originally a passing 
grade of “C” to a failing grade of “F” where there is no scholastic dishonesty, such as 
cheating on an exam or plagiarism, seems arbitrary and capricious. Ideally, grades are 
assigned by instructors based on the work completed by the students in a fair 
environment where methods of evaluation are applied equally. In this case, the instructor 
plainly informed Ms. Tatro that her grade was changed due to behavior outside the 
context of the classroom on her Facebook page. In this regard, I believe a grade appeal 
was justified, as it would be based on an unjust and excessive action against an individual 
student and not on the basis of the instructor’s grading standard. 
Second, requiring a psychiatric evaluation and the completion of any 
recommendation made as a result of that evaluation because of four Facebook posts 
seems to me not only an excessive reaction, but one that is not actually in the purview of 
the CCSB, a body whose membership does not comprise mental health professionals.  
Again, while some might find her words upsetting, I wonder how often members of that 
very committee may have uttered the words, “I could have killed him or her” when 
referring to a stressful situation with a colleague or an argument with a significant other. 
These are phrases in our vernacular, and we tend not to think twice about them when they 
are spoken aloud. We certainly do not assume that every person who articulates 
frustration by employing a similar phrase actually intends to commit murder. Nor do we 
normally assume that the person has serious mental health issues. We infer from the  
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speaker a level of frustration to which we can typically relate, and we often laugh it off, 
never to think about it again. In this case, the difference is that Amanda Tatro wrote these 
things on a Facebook page, and many of us raised prior to the age of technology view the 
written word as different from the spoken word. That is not necessarily the case for 
current college students. For them, communication by text or on Facebook, Twitter, 
Instagram, and other types of social media is equivalent to speaking in person. 
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Should higher education institutions monitor students’ social media? 
 There are a number of important questions to consider before we start sliding 
down the slippery slope of social media monitoring. For example, would it be reasonable 
for a college or university to monitor its students’ phone conversations? Would it be 
reasonable to read their mail or eavesdrop on a shared in-person conversation? Many of 
us would scoff at these notions, claiming that these would all be intrusions into privacy 
and violations of free speech rights. Why, then, do so many colleges and universities 
view social media differently? I contend that there are two primary reasons:  1) there is 
currently a generation gap in the way social media is perceived, and 2) the ability of 
social media to reach large audiences scares most institutions. 
 Most of the college students with whom I have worked in my career view a 
“conversation” over Facebook, Twitter, or other social media platforms in the same 
manner as they view an in-person conversation. In my experience, they do not consider 
the permanency factor of social media sites. They cannot comprehend that comments stay 
there forever and may be accessed by anyone. For them, once that Snapchat is gone, it is 
gone, never to be seen again. In contrast, most of the colleagues with whom I work—staff 
members, faculty, and administrators—view the written word, in whatever form, as 
fundamentally different from verbal conversation. Those of us born in a time before 
home computers were the norm, before cell phones existed, before email was regularly 
used to communicate view the written word as lasting and permanent. When we were 
growing up, we interacted with our friends at school, or when we saw them over the 
weekend, or we talked on the phone. Today, a student can text friends whenever s/he 
likes, and even post a note to several friends at three o’clock in the morning. 
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Furthermore, students can easily compartmentalize those communications. One message 
can be posted to Facebook, especially if Mom, Dad, and grandma are Facebook 
“friends.” An entirely different, and possibly more honest and revealing message, can be 
sent via Instagram or Twitter.   
 While older generations tend to be wary of “friending” people on Facebook if we 
do not actually know them in our “real” lives, the younger generation views online 
interactions with strangers as real and meaningful. It has fast become a primary platform 
for building relationships and developing intimacy with others (Kord & Wolf-Wendel, 
2009). For example, in 2004 Facebook reported roughly 1 million users. By 2009, it 
reported 250 million users. As of 2014, it has crossed the 1 billion user mark (Facebook, 
2014). And, while Facebook usage among younger students is declining, new platforms 
are discovered and utilized faster than institutions can track them. According to Pew 
Research, 90% of internet users between the ages of 18 and 29 use social media sites, as 
compared with 78% percent in the 30-49 age group, and only 65% in the 50-64 age group 
(Social Networking Fact Sheet, 2014). 
 What are the implications for perceptions of communication and First 
Amendment rights? Most administrators at colleges and universities—those making 
policy—are in the age groups utilizing social media less frequently. According to the 
American Council on Education, the average age of a college president in 2012 was 61, 
and more than half of all presidents were over the age of 60 (Cook, 2012). Can we 
reasonably expect those born in 1953—the year that color television was introduced—to 
quickly make the leap to recognizing and understanding fundamental differences in 
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perceptions of communication when they are among those using these new technologies 
the least? Furthermore, can we reasonably expect them to form good policies around the 
use of these technologies? 
 I am not suggesting that administrators over the age of 60 are incapable of 
formulating effective and appropriate social media policies, nor am I naïve to the reality 
that such policies are typically drawn up by committees or subordinates, not by college 
presidents themselves. However, I do think the graying of college campuses may be 
contributing to the fear that institutions seem to share when it comes to social media and 
conduct codes. It could be that older administrators and faculty are wary of social media 
and wish to contain its effects on campuses; however, it strikes me as just as likely that 
college presidents are fearful of the negative publicity that could result from a post or 
tweet deemed to be in “bad taste.” 
  In terms of protecting the reputation of the institution, it is understandable that 
campuses would want to monitor students’ (and employees’) use of social media, to 
ensure that nothing potentially damaging is said. Considered against the framework of 
individual rights to expression and privacy, it becomes an extraordinarily difficult issue 
for many people. 
 PK-12 schools are already starting to deal with this challenging question. In 2013, 
a Los Angeles area school district hired an external company to monitor its students’ 
social media activities for one year. It cost the district over $40,000 to receive reports on 
its roughly 14,000 middle and high school students. The CEO of the firm, Geo Listening, 
commented, “Parents and school district personnel -- they are not able to effectively 
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listen to the conversation where it's happening now. The notion about talking in class is 
about as old-fashioned as a Studebaker, no offense to the makers of the car” (Martinez, 
2013).   
 There are strong arguments on both sides of the issue. On the one hand, this 
monitoring takes place on public sites, such as Facebook, so there is no reasonable 
expectation of privacy, and students are free to adjust privacy settings to avoid the 
monitoring of private conversations. On the other hand, as Lee Tien, senior staff attorney 
for the Electronic Frontier Foundation put it, “The question is what is the school doing?  
It's not stumbling into students—like a teacher running across a student on the street. This 
is the school sending someone to watch them” (Martinez, 2013). 
 Other schools have employed the services of CompuGuardian, a company that 
offers a wide array of services, including website tracking, instant message/chat tracking, 
keystroke captures, web search history, social media monitoring, and regular screenshot 
recording, all of which (and more) can be done in “stealth mode,” so the user is not even 
aware. It allows schools to do remote monitoring in real time and offers the option to 
block programs or websites, lock an individual user’s computer, block chatting, send 
messages to a user, and even log off or shut down a user’s computer. 
 Daniel Domenech, executive director of the American Association of School 
Administrators admits that the legality of monitoring PK-12 students’ social media 
activities is “very much up in the air,” but also recommends “the best guideline we can 
give school districts is to always go back to the issue of the safety of the students 
uppermost. If the safety of a student's involved and you are not necessarily sure whether 
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the district has the authority to do it or not, well, you know what, go out on a limb at that 
point, because if you are talking about saving a student's life then you'd rather be safe 
than sorry” (Wallace, 2014). 
 Again, so far, most of the cases regarding active monitoring of social media 
involve PK-12 students, and the results are mixed. Each state approaches the law 
differently, resulting in vastly diverse outcomes. The consequence is no clear legal 
precedent when it comes to monitoring. The cases that do involve college and university 
students appear to be exclusive to athletics programs, as previously referenced, and I was 
unable to locate any legal challenges to those programs. 
 In my mind, there can be only one answer to the question of higher education 
institutions actively monitoring students’ social media activities, and that answer is a 
resounding “no.” Aside from the additional costs incurred, it sends a terrible message to a 
student body and, in my opinion, is diametrically opposed to the intent of the law.   
Higher education already struggles with a poor image related to cost. Adding to 
rising tuition and fees by either hiring a company to do monitoring and reporting, or 
hiring additional internal staff to develop a software program to do it is unnecessary and 
wasteful, particularly since the legal landscape is currently confusing and convoluted 
(Van der Werf, 2007). 
Given my own twenty years of experience working on college campuses, it is 
easy to imagine the kinds of riotous response an institution might encounter upon 
announcing active social media monitoring of its student body. Furthermore, it sends the 
message that speech is something to be monitored, reported on, and disciplined, all of 
which have a chilling effect on developing minds. 
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Finally, with all we have explored in this paper, reading the words of the United 
States Supreme Court describing institutions of higher education as “vital centers for the 
Nation's intellectual life,” it is improbable to conceive that the Court could allow such 
monitoring of freedom of expression on our campuses. Given all of the legal precedent it 
seems likely that, presented with the opportunity, the Court would find such activity to be 
a violation of the First Amendment. 
For these reasons, I believe that colleges and universities should not engage in 
active monitoring of students’ social media. 
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Should higher education institutions discipline speech at all?  Are there limits?   
 With all we have explored throughout this paper, my answer to this question may 
seem obvious. Yes, higher education institutions may discipline speech; however, those 
limits should be reached only where the need is absolutely necessary due to a true threat 
and where the law is the clear basis for the restriction. Colleges and universities need to 
be mindful of their rare place in our society as places of research and questioning, and 
must vigilantly protect and value that mission for the good of us all.   
 Just as faculty hold dear the principle of academic freedom for their work, so too 
must institutions instill in their students this same concept of open exploration of ideas, 
even those that are controversial and challenging. Without the ability to think critically 
and question openly, our history might be entirely different. Perhaps we would still 
operate under British rule; maybe Nazis would reign supreme; conceivably, women and 
African-Americans would not have the right to vote, nor to be thought of as equals in our 
society (at least, in theory).   
 While the notion of open dissent should be taught to our children from an early 
age, simple observation suggests that our PK-12 system largely encourages and values 
conformity as the supreme manner of being. The fact that our public school system 
groups children for grade placement largely by age, rather than intellectual ability, is the 
most overwhelming evidence. In a sense, we treat our public education system somewhat 
like a factory, so the concepts of conformity and linear thinking are not surprising, and 
the overall system does not lend itself to creative and diverse ways of thinking. 
“Creativity” and “diversity” have recently become very important in our educational  
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system, with endless articles published about companies craving both in their workforces. 
However, the evidence suggests that, even as businesses advertise for these ideas, they 
summarily reject them out of a sense of uncertainty (Mueller, Melwani & Goncalo, 
2012).   
 In higher education, I would argue that this rejection of challenging thought has 
contributed to the concept of “campus conduct creep,” to which I referred earlier. Not 
only have conduct codes reached beyond the physical campus, but they have also 
stretched far beyond the scope of what the law allows. Although they often refer to the 
ideal of “respecting the rights of others,” their translation and application of this principle 
often seem to be, “do not say anything that possibly may be construed as even slightly 
offensive to any other person, regardless of your right to free speech.” Here are just a few 
examples of this kind of vague and overbroad language, taken from current conduct 
codes around the country: 
• refrain from behavior that impairs the University’s reputation in the community 
• any behavior which for any reason interferes with the class work of others 
• in their off-campus lives, students are expected to conform to standards 
• actions unreasonably disruptive of the University community/neighborhoods 
• making any communication (including social media) to another person in any 
manner likely to cause alarm 
 
• use of speech that threatens the well-being of any person(s) 
• participating in a demonstration that disrupts the normal operations  
• While many of the University’s standards of conduct parallel the laws of society 
in general, University standards also may be set higher and more stringently than 
those found elsewhere in society. For these reasons, the University focuses 
	   61	  
primarily on educating students about their behavior, but may impose sanctions 
up to and including suspension and expulsion in order to preserve a safe and 
healthy environment for the University community. 
 
• acting always in a manner that enhances the well-being of others 
 
• the University reserves the right to impose discipline based on any student 
conduct, regardless of location, when that conduct may adversely affect the 
University community 
 
• actions or statements that intimidate another 
 
• Recognizing off-campus behaviors often directly affect the educational 
environment or substantially interfere with the mission of the university, the 
university shall have the right to adjudicate any alleged violation of any provision 
of the Student Conduct Code, without regard for the geographic location of the 
alleged violation, at the discretion of the Dean of Students. This may include 
violations that occur partly or entirely through electronic means. 
 
As I stated earlier, these are just a few examples of the type of ambiguous and open-
ended language utilized in current conduct codes. Why institutions feel that they can 
somehow operate above the law or outside of the law escapes me, but the fact is that they 
do not have that right. There is no United States Supreme Court precedent to support that 
myth. In fact, given the Court’s own words, there is every reason to believe that many of 
these conduct codes, if challenged in court, would not meet the significant burden the 
Court has upheld over the years. 
 In my opinion, higher education institutions would be wise to employ resources 
such as FIRE, the ACLU (American Civil Liberties Union), the SPLC (Southern Poverty 
Law Center), the AAUP (American Association of University Professors), and other 
organizations with strong backgrounds in legal protection of civil liberties when crafting 
conduct codes to ensure that individual rights remain a cornerstone of the final document. 
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Furthermore, I believe this is a case where simpler—as opposed to overly complex—may 
be a benefit. In my experience, policies are often drafted under the worst of 
circumstances, as the result of a single incident. Rather than craft policy from a position 
of reaction, conduct codes should be proactive documents, reviewed regularly within the 
context of the current legal standards. 
 I was unable to locate an institution with a student conduct code containing a 
separate and discrete section dedicated to social media use. (Obviously, this does not 
mean that one does not exist, as I did not complete an exhaustive search of the thousands 
of higher education institutions in the United States.) There were some student conduct 
codes that referenced both on-campus and off-campus speech and mentioned social 
media as included in those definitions, and there were some that simply stated that 
students were expected to adhere to the conduct code regardless of location (without 
making specific mention to the phrases on-campus and off-campus). There were a 
number of faculty and staff conduct codes, policies, or guidelines that contained specific 
social media sections or referenced social media use.   
In considering “best practices” for colleges and universities, I was struck by part 
of the 2013-2014 General Information Catalog on the website for the University of Texas 
at Austin. This chapter, entitled, “Speech, Expression, and Assembly,” begins with three 
basic tenets, abbreviated here: 
• Freedoms of speech, expression, and assembly are fundamental rights, central to 
the mission of the University 
 
• Students, faculty, and staff are free to express their views 
 
• The University will not discriminate against students, faculty, or staff based on 
their views 
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In our society, turning eighteen marks the end of childhood and the beginning of our 
adult journey. We gain the right to vote, to serve in the armed forces, and to be 
independent from parental/guardian control. For many of us, this coincides with our 
passage from high school to college. We are empowered to participate fully as citizens of 
our surrounding society. While it is incumbent on us to know our rights—and exercise 
them—when it comes to freedom of expression, we should also be able to depend on our 
institutions of higher learning to follow the law and not attempt to abridge our freedom.  
Unfortunately, as established in this document, that is simply not the case. All too often, 
campus policies and programs serve to influence our thinking toward conformity and 
obedience, rather than welcoming us to a community of open thinking and expression. 
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Conclusion 
 I believe we must restore our college campuses to their once esteemed position in 
our culture as places of intellectual challenge, where fields of knowledge are advanced 
and art is elevated through research. In order to do this, we must allow space once again 
for dissent, discussion, and even argument. We must serve as examples of balance 
between rights and responsibilities, and teach those concepts, rather than force 
submission to policies that limit our most basic freedoms. In my opinion, this is where 
our best practices must start. 
Best Practices for Student Conduct Codes in Colleges and Universities  
• Policies must respect the basic rights of freedom of speech and expression 
afforded by our Constitution 
 
• Policies must adhere to legal precedent 
 
• Policy language must be specific and precise 
 
• Policies must relate to conduct, not mode nor medium 
 
• Policies must protect personal physical safety 
 
• Policies should reflect a commitment to educate and inform, not merely 
discipline 
 
• Policies may (and should) address time, place, and manner restrictions in 
sufficient specificity to make to clear students what is permissible and what is 
not 
 
• Colleges and universities must not actively monitor online activities 
 
• Institutions should engage organizations with strong backgrounds in legal 
protection of civil liberties when crafting conduct codes (FIRE, ACLU, etc.) 
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As I commenced research for this paper, I felt sure that the standard for higher 
education was a hybrid of Tinker and public employment legal precedent. Now, I am 
convinced that my conclusion aligns with that of the Supreme Court: “The First 
Amendment leaves no room for the operation of a dual standard in the academic 
community with respect to the content of speech” (Papish, 1973, p. 671).  
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